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ABSTRACT 




University of New Hampshire, December, 2011 
This thesis analyzes the contributing factors to the Bloc Quebecois' overwhelming loss 
in the 2011 Canadian Federal Election. Using both qualitative evidence and statistical 
analysis, it will investigate the extent in which five potential causes affected this 
outcome: a shift in support of the New Democratic Party, the distribution of 
Francophone protest party votes, campaign strategies of the New Democratic Party and 





On May 2 2011, the Canadian people sent a message that realigned the 
political landscape in the federal House of Commons.1 The Conservative Party 
defied all polls and finally secured a majority government in Parliament. The 
once-dominant Liberal Party, which forced the 2011 election, not only suffered its 
greatest loss in its history but also lost its leader Michael Ignatieff who could not 
win his own riding.2 Additionally, the Green Party finally broke through with leader 
Elizabeth May winning a seat in the House of Commons. Truly dramatic changes 
occurred with both the separatist Bloc Quebecois and the leftist New Democratic 
Party in the province of Quebec. The Bloc Quebecois (often referred to as the 
Bloc or BQ) became the Official Opposition in its inaugural election in 1993 and 
had maintained a majority of seats in Quebec ever since. Yet, this time the New 
Democratic Party (often referred to as the NDP) won 59 seats in the province 
after only possessing one in 2008.3 Meanwhile the Bloc shockingly dropped from 
49 seats in 2008 to only four seats in 2011, a prediction not even the most daring 
1
 The terms "Parliament" and "House of Commons" are interchangeably in this paper. 
2
 Riding is the term used in Canada for a Parliamentary District. 
3
 NDP candidate Thomas Mulcair first won the riding of Outremont in a special election in 2007. He then 
became the first NDP member to win in a general election in Quebec with his victory in 2008. 
1 
pundit made. Therefore my research question is: Why did the Bloc Quebecois 
suffer such heavy losses in the 2011 Canadian Federal Election? 
Table 1: Bloc Quebecois Election Results in Quebec 
Election % of Vote Bloc Quebecois Seats 
1993 49.3% 54 
1997 37.9% 44 
2000 39.9% 38 
2004 48.9% 54 
2006 42.1% 51 
2008 38.1%. 49 
2011 23.4% 4 
Note: As The Bloc Quebecois is a separatist party, it only runs candidates in the province of Quebec. 
Therefore the percentage of the vote and seat total is only within the province. All electoral data used is 
from Elections Canada. 
One of the best examples illustrating the scope of the NDPs "Orange 
Crush" is the Members of Parliament (MPs) referred to as the "McGill Five."4 The 
four undergraduate students and one doctoral student at McGill University were 
on the ballot as NDP candidates in largely symbolic fashion. They were running 
in strong Bloc Quebecois districts and appeared to have little chance of victory. 
Three of them (Borg, Freeman and Liu) were not even native Quebecers. 
Charmaine Borg planned to spend her fall in Mexico and did not even attempt to 
monitor the vote count in her riding.5 The chances of victory appeared so slim 
that multiple candidates admitted that they never visited nor campaigned in their 
riding.6 They instead spent their time helping Quebec's one New Democratic 
Party MP, Thomas Mulcair, win re-election. 
4
 Scott, M. (2011, May 4). "McGill 5 Head Off to House of Commons." Montreal Gazette. 
5
 Porter, C. (2011, May 14). "Dose of Reality For Political Junkies..." Toronto Star. 
6
 Scott, M. (2011, May 4). "McGill 5 Head Off to House of Commons." Montreal Gazette. 
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Note: The column "Prev Margin" represents the average victory margin of the defeated BQ incumbent in 
their previous elections. All electoral data used in from Elections Canada. 
Despite the pollsters predicting strong NDP gains in Quebec, no reason 
existed to believe that these ridings would fall victim to the Orange Crush. Four of 
the ridings were represented by the Bloc Quebecois since 1993 (Vaudreuil-
Soulanges being the exception) and four of the ridings featured incumbent MPs 
who were elected at least 3 times previously (Riviere-des-Mille-lles being the 
exception). Furthermore, each incumbent Bloc MP in these ridings enjoyed 
double-digit margins of victory in previous elections. It is within this context that 
we witnessed the wave in which NDP candidates rode into Ottawa. The results 
were stunning as all five students won with over 40% of the vote with all margins 
of over 15%. 
While the McGill Five provides an example of the overwhelming impact 
that the New Democratic Party had on the Bloc Quebecois, no similarities seem 
apparent among the four surviving Bloc MPs. Strangely enough, the sole 
freshman Bloc MP, Jean-Francois Fortin, was the only candidate to win by a 
3 
double digit margin. Meanwhile, Louis Plamondon, the last active MP to cross the 
floor and form the Bloc Quebecois in 1991, barely survived with a 2.7% margin 
and 38.3% of the vote. In his previous eight elections, his average margin of 
victory was 35.55%. Andre Bellavance hung on in an Eastern Township region 
that lost six other Bloc MPs that had had equal or better electoral strength as 
Bellavance in previous elections.7 Maria Mourani never had an easy time in the 
Montreal district of Ahuntsic as the Liberal candidate narrowly defeated her in 
2004 but then won tight victories in 2006 and 2008. Despite the influx of votes for 
the NDP and the continued presence of a strong Liberal challenger, Mourani 
actually won by a bigger margin than she had in 2006. 
The result is difficult to understand, as one minor party defeated another 
to gain the title of Official Opposition in the House of Commons. This provides yet 
another case study as to why Canada is a main exception to Duverger's Law.8 
The law remains strong in most other electoral situations, which indicates the 
strength of Quebec's regional interests compared to Canada's national interests. 
Quebec's voting block acts very independently from the rest of the country and 
has been the catalyst for any extreme electoral results in the country's history. 
7(2004, Nov 8). "Duceppe Backtracks on the Canadian Flag Flap." CTVNews. 
When later considering the extent of the militant sovereigntist vote for the BQ in 2011, it is important to 
note that Bellavance is most famous for refusing to provide Canadian flags to a Royal Canadian Legion hall 
in his riding. 
Duverger's Law is fully explained in the Literature Review. 
4 
Table 3: Elected Bloc Quebecois MPs in 2011 
MP Age Riding 
Andre Bellavance 47 Richmond-Arthabaska 
Jean-Francois Fortin 38 Haute-Gaspesie—La Mitis—Mantane-Matapedia 
Louis Plamondon 68 Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet-Becancour 
Maria Mourani 42 Ahuntsic 
MP Region Vote Margin Incumbent Prev Margin 
Louis Plamondon Central Quebec 38.3% 2.7% 8-Time 35.5% 
Jean-Francois Fortin Eastern Quebec 36.1% 10.5% 
Maria Mourani Montreal 31.8% 1.5% 2-Time 1.3% 
Andre Bellavance E. Townships 33.8% 1.3% 3-Time 20.4% 
Note: The column Prev Margin "represents" the average victory margin of these BQ members in all 
elections prior to 2011. Jean-Francois Fortin was running for the House of Commons for the first time in 
2011. All electoral data used is from Elections Canada. 
It is within the context of these statistics and trends that we ask why the 
Bloc Quebecois suffered such heavy losses in the 2011 Canadian Federal 
Election. It appears that no one single cause exists. Rather a multitude of 
variables culminated in the "perfect storm" for dramatic electoral change in 
Quebec. The New Democratic Party's sudden electoral legitimacy in the province 
may have provided Quebeckers with a clear alternative to the three parties that 
they had supported strongly in the past. For Francophone voters who wanted to 
express their displeasure in the federal government while maintaining a 
moderate or federalist view on separatism, the NDP may have provided such an 
outlet.9 The stunning defeat of the Bloc Quebecois may have been a result of 
declining support and salience of the issue of Quebec separatism. The NDP 
leader Jack Layton's courting of Quebec during the election cycle may have 
swayed the Quebec people. Quebecers may also have been unimpressed by 
Gilles Duceppe's erratic and unenergetic campaign strategy. Finally, the losses 
9
 Federalist Quebeckers are those who do not believe that Quebec should separate from the rest of 
Canada. Moderates are those who seek some special autonomy from Canada, yet do not actively desire 
separatism. 
5 
of the Bloc Quebecois are possibly inflated based upon the single member 
district plurality (SMDP) riding system contrasted to the actual percentage of the 
vote in the province. This paper will investigate these potential causes and their 




The study of federal voting behavior in Canada is intriguing. Canada has a 
multi-party parliamentary system with candidates in single-member ridings 
getting elected via the first-past-the-post system. This makes Canada a notable 
exception to Duverger's Law as "third parties" have a history of gaining 
considerable influence in the House of Commons.10 While the Liberal Party or the 
Conservative Party has always formed the government, multiple third parties 
gained enough seats to make an impact on the government. Within the past two 
decades, we have seen the Bloc Quebecois and New Democratic Party become 
the Official Opposition (the second largest party in Parliament). Federal voting 
behavior in Quebec is of particular interest because the province is largely 
French-speaking and Catholic in a country that is overwhelmingly English-
Note: Duverger's law stipulated that in systems like Canada where they elect members of Parliament 
with a first-past the-post single-member district plurality, only two legitimate parties would exist. 
Riker, W. (1982). The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science. 
American Political Science Review. 76 (4) p 760. 
7 
speaking and Protestant.11 The differences between the Quebeckers and the 
federal government are profound. The issue of Quebec sovereignty or autonomy 
has only intensified over time.12 Even today, the historically powerful 'resentment' 
continues among Quebeckers, with one of their current foci being the 
Conservatives' appointment of a unilingual auditor general.13 The Bloc 
Quebecois formed in 1993 by providing a place for those who take a strong 
position on Quebec separatism and had become wildly popular in the province. 
Despite Quebec having no major victories in its battle for autonomy and the 
possibility of future separation looking bleak, the BQ had emerged as the 'party 
for Quebec' It remained a formidable force in the Canadian House of Commons 
until it was nearly dismantled in the past election.14 
Origins of Quebec Alienation 
A discussion on distinct political differences in Quebec must begin with the 
province's alienation from the rest of Canada since its early history. The land 
originally was part of New France but became the British Province of Quebec in 
1764 after the Seven Years' War15. The British Conquest of 1760-63 essentially 
According the 2006 Canadian Census only 21.1% of Canadians identify as Francophone while 81.1% of 
Quebeckers do. According to the 2001 Canadian Census (question not asked in 2006 Census) 43.1% of 
Canadians are Catholic while 83.2% of Quebeckers are. 
12
 Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 582. 
13
 De Souza, M. (2011, Nov 9). "Maxime Bemier Unhappy With Choice Of Unilingual Michael Ferguson For 
Auditor General." National Post. 
14
 Young, L Belanger, E. (2008). "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist 
Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 488. 
15
 Dyck, R. (2008) Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches p 101. 
8 
expelled France from North America but left a small population of French 
habitants. They generally resented British rule, although concessions were made 
so that they could retain their Catholicism and civil law system. The differences 
between the Francophones and Anglophones were accentuated as the 
Constitutional Act of 1791 divided the Province into Upper Canada and Lower 
Canada based upon lingual lines. They were not reunified until 1841.16 While 
Confederation was designed to help put aside differences amongst the two 
lingual groups, tension existed from the start of the country. In 1885, Prime 
Minister John Macdonald made a very controversial move to execute Louis Riel 
for inciting and leading both the Red River Rebellion and the North-West 
Rebellion.17 The basis for Riel's actions was to fight for the Metis people who felt 
unfairly treated by Macdonald's government.18 Despite staging his rebellions in 
Western Canada, he was thought of very fondly in Quebec due to his French 
Catholic heritage.19 After the execution took place, a trite Macdonald famously 
said, "He shall hang, though every dog in Quebec bark in his favour."20 
Development of Early Canadian Party Systems 
Alan Cairns, one of the first theorists of voting behavior in Canada, 
seemed deeply troubled with the political system of his country. Since the 
creation of the Canadian state in 1867 until the time of his research in the early 
16
 Ibid p 101. 
17
 Ibid p 102. 
18
 Metis are Canadians who have a mixed European and Aboriginal heritage. 
19
 Dyck, R. (2008). Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches p 102. 
20
 Ibid 
1960's, the Liberal and Conservative Parties alternately dominated and minor 
parties appeared to play no significant role.21 The Liberal Party was particularly 
dominant in Canada. This is not surprising due to Quebec's overwhelming 
support of the Liberals during this period. While Duverger would expect such a 
system, Cairns did not see the Canadian House of Commons and the two-party 
system as conducive to the welfare of the electorate. As the majority party held 
indefinite political power, the minority is disenfranchised of any political authority. 
His suggestion was to allow a proportional representation system in order to 
afford third parties more access and create an "effective opposition."22 Yet, this 
proposition would become moot as the evolution and the eventual breakthrough 
of third parties (the Bloc Quebecois and the New Democratic Party) would end 
up fulfilling Cairns' vision instead. However, some still argue to this day that a 
proportional representation system in Canada would allow for even more 
effective opposition, as it would include parties with smaller and scattered 
support. It would also prevent the inflated number of seats that the majority party 
typically receives. This issue is in the Results section below with the fifth 
hypothesis. 
21
 Cairns, A. (1968). "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965." Canadian Journal 




First Impact of the Quebec Voting Block 
By the late 1960's and 1970's, the popularity of the Social Credit Party led 
to a breakthrough in gained seats for the party.23 Although its reign was short-
lived, the party's membership was overwhelmingly from Quebec (known as 
Creditistes) that had briefly allowed for the "effective opposition" that Cairns had 
desired.24 While the party would implode due to friction and an eventual split 
between the Creditistes25 and the English SoCreds in other provinces, Quebec 
proved to be a breeding ground for successful third party candidates. After the 
"Quiet Revolution" in the 1960's, citizens of Quebec became increasingly 
disillusioned with the federal government. Many began to desire separation.26 
The popularity of the Creditistes as a protest party appeared to be a mechanism 
by which Quebeckers could politicize their anti-government sentiment. This 
movement would eventually lead to the "ideological parties" of the provincial Parti 
Quebecois and the federal Bloc Quebecois.27 
23
 Belanger, E. (2004) 'The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 582. 
24
 Cairns, A. (1968). "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965." Canadian Journal 
of Political Science, 1 (1) p 57. 
25 When they officially split in 1963 the Quebec faction of the Social Credit Party became known as the 
Ralliement Creditiste du Quebec. 
26
 The Quiet Revolution is a period in Quebec in the 1960's that resulted in radical changes, namely rapid 
secularization, provincialiy controlled health care and education and the beginning of political distinctions 
between federalists and separatists. 
Pinard, M.; Hamilton, R. (1978). "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec 
Election." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11 (4) p 743. 
27
 Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 585. 
11 
Jerome Black (1978) identified the Quiet Revolution as a catalyst for 
political change in Canada and sought to explain this "multicandidate calculus of 
voting". Building on the work of Cairns, he tried to explain why the two-party 
system was dominant as well as why third parties were emerging. His theory was 
that voters who sympathized with a minor party would vote for it if (1) they 
believed their candidate had a legitimate chance of winning or (2) if they believed 
they could not affect the outcome between the two major parties.28 While the 
initial voting for the Creditistes came from the Quebeckers as 'protest votes,' 
particularly based upon economic frustration, the party gained legitimacy in every 
subsequent election.29 Eventually, Quebec voters perceived that a Creditiste MP 
had a legitimate chance of making it to the Parliament and, in the 1962 election, 
26 Creditistes were elected.30 Quebec's ability to elect third party candidates to 
the House of Commons in the 1960's would be a harbinger of future elections. 
Emergence of Separatism in Quebec 
Although Quebec was a stronghold of liberalism for most of the 20th 
century, the Liberal party at both the national and provincial level had alienated 
Quebec voters during the Quiet Revolution. The Creditiste movement would only 
be the start of political change in the province. Separatist sentiment increased in 
28
 Black, J. (1978). "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." 
American Journal of Political Science, 22 (3) p 631. 
29
 Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 585. 
30
 Ibid p 582. 
Black, J. (1978). "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." 
American Journal of Political Science, 22 (3) p 631. 
12 
Quebec during the 1960s and 70s. The rest of the provinces remained very much 
against Quebec gaining any special autonomy.31 The separatists formed the Parti 
Quebecois in 1968 at the provincial level in order to contend with Liberals and 
advance Quebec autonomy. While the PQ began with a solid militant base, they 
shockingly overwhelmed the Liberals and swept into office by taking the 
provincial parliament in 1976.32 This is largely attributed to mass negative 
opinions of the Liberal Party and the increasing saliency to voters of the PQ 
platform to voters. The PQ began with mainly voters that favored secession, but 
soon established a platform that appealed to moderates and non-separatists as 
well.33 It would be this strategy that the Bloc Quebecois would adopt at the 
federal level in order to remain a strong presence in Parliament.34 
PQ voters during this period were typically better educated and had a 
higher socio-economic status than the average Quebec voter.35 This proved to 
be a significant expansion of the voting base because the Creditistes were only 
successful in the poor and rural ridings. Pinard claims that this is due to the 
different characteristics of each. The Creditistes were a protest party while the 
PQ was an ideological party.36 The appeal of the Creditistes would depend on 
Pinard, M.; Hamilton, R. (1978). "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec 
Election." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11 (4) p 748. 
32
 Ibid p 744. 
33
 Ibid p 739. 
34
 Young, L. Belanger, E. (2008). "BQ in the House: The Nature of Sovereigntist 
Representation in the Canadian Parliament." Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 14 (4) p 502. 
35
 Hunter, A.A. (1982). "On Class, Status and Voting in Canada." Canadian Journal of Sociology, 7 (1) p 26. 
36
 According to Pinard a protest party is one simply seeking economic changes, while an ideological party 
has a greater agenda (like separatism); Belanger, E. (2004). "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian 
Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p585. 
13 
the economic conditions at the time while the issue of Quebec separatism was 
independent of economic context. Modern research about the Bloc Quebecois 
does not show a statistical significance between high SES and electoral support, 
yet they are not disproportionately voted against by the better educated either.37 
Ornstein and Stevenson suggest that the 'rich' are split on separatism based 
upon their professions and interests.38 Unsurprisingly, federal government 
officials are overwhelmingly against separatism while provincial officials are 
heavily in favor of it.39 Businesspeople are split as well due to a conundrum 
between sympathizing with the ideology and the real economic ramifications of 
separation.40 The only obvious distinction on separatism is between 
Francophones and Anglophones. Language has been a constant issue in 
Canada and those who speak French generally feel more culturally distinct from 
the rest of Canada. Yet this should not be overstated as a much stronger 
correlation exists between separatism and a Francophone living in a 
homogenous area compared all Francophones living in Quebec.41 
37
 Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An 
Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 93. 
38 
Ornstein, M.D.; Stevenson, H.M. (1981). "Elite and Public Opinion before the Quebec Referendum: A 
Commentary on the State in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (4) p 762. 
39
 Ibid p 762. 
40
 Ibid p 751. 
41
 Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An 
Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 92. 
14 
Decline of the Liberals in Quebec 
While the Liberal Party was dominant for most of the 20 century in 
Canada, it was particularly dominant within the province of Quebec. Prior to the 
1984 election, the Liberals had held the majority of Quebec seats in all but one 
election (1962) and in the 1980 election, they won 74 of 75 seats. Yet it is in this 
short four-year period that the fortunes of Liberals would forever change in 
Quebec. 
The transformation began when the Parti Quebecois provincial 
government called a referendum in 1980 to determine whether Quebeckers 
desired independence from the rest of Canada. The measure was defeated 
handily as the 'No' side won by a vote of 59.56%-40.44%.42 This prompted then-
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to seek to bring Quebec into the fold through the 
1982 Constitution Act. Yet this measure angered Quebeckers as it framed 
Canada as a centralized, bilingual country as opposed to Quebec as a distinct 
society.43 
It worsened for the Liberals in Quebec and the rest of Canada when 
Trudeau's successor, John Turner, stated that he lacked an option when 
following through with last-minute Trudeau patronage appointments at the 1984 
42
 Ornstein, M.D.; Stevenson, H.M. (1981). "Elite and Public Opinion before the Quebec Referendum: A 
Commentary on the State in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (4) p 747. 
43
 Dyck, R. (2008). Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches p 110. 
15 
Leader's Debate. Progressive Conservative leader and Quebec native Brian 
Mulroney responded 
"You had an option sir. You could have said, 'I am not going to do it. This is 
wrong for Canada, and I am not going to ask Canadians to pay the price.' You 
had an option sir - to say no- and you chose to say yes to the old attitudes and 
the old stories of the Liberal Party. That sir, If I may say respectfully, that is not 
good enough for Canadians." 







































































































Note: The number and percentage of seats represent the share that the Liberal Party won in each election 
in the province of Quebec. All election data used is from Elections Canada. 
A reeling Turner once again exclaimed that he had no option. In a moment 
that solidified his image with Canadians, Mulroney said, "this is an avowal of 
failure and a confession of non-leadership. You had an option sir, you could have 
done better."44 Mulroney's Conservatives would win in a landslide. A stunning 57 
of their 108 seat gains came from Quebec. 
1984 Leaders Debate CBC Archives 
16 
Emergence of the Bloc Quebecois 
Events leading up to the 1993 federal election appeared to cultivate the 
proper conditions for a dramatic change in the House of Commons. The 1980 
referendum represented a solid win for the federalists. Yet much unrest still 
existed between Quebec and the rest of the country. Two attempts by the 
Mulroney government at reconciling Quebec (the Meech Lake Accords and the 
Charlottetown Accords) not only failed, but conjured up further anti-government 
sentiment.45 The two major parties weakened as Conservative Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney became very unpopular due to unemployment and an economic 
downturn. Many Quebeckers felt equally alienated by the Liberals.46 This trend 
permeated the rest of Canada as well, as the New Democratic Party picked up 
an unprecedented 43 seats in 1988. The Conservative party began to splinter.47 
After Meech Lake failed, the Conservative Party splintered as a majority of 
Western MPs broke away and started the Reform party. Prominent Quebeckers 
on both sides of the aisle made their move. The Bloc Quebecois formed as many 
Conservative and Liberal MPs in Quebec had lost hope that the federal 
45
 The Meech Lake Accords in 1987 and the Charlottetown Accords in 1992 were both failed attempts and 
amending the Constitution of Canada, with each make certain endorsements and statements about 
Quebec as a distinct society. 
Lublin, D.; Voss, D.S. (2002). "Context and Francophone Support for the Sovereignty of Quebec: An 
Ecological Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 35 (1) p 92. 
46
 Belanger, E. (2004.) 'The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited." 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 586. 
47
 The New Democratic Party is a prevalent third party that is generally regarded as the most liberal in 
Parliament (Ironically the Liberal Party is moderate). 
Belanger, E. (2004). The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited. 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37 (3) p 587. 
17 
government would ever give Quebec a remedy it desired.48 The desperate, 
second solution of the Mulroney government, the Charlottetown Accord, was 
therefore also dead in the water. The Bloc felt the accord did not go far enough 
while the Reform Party refused to recognize Quebec as a distinct society.49 
Led by former Mulroney minister Lucien Bouchard, the Bloc Quebecois 
filled the power vacuum in the 1993 election and won 54 seats. By narrowly 
beating out the Reform party, the BQ became the Official Opposition in only its 
first election.50 This initial wave is consistent with Black's theory. Quebec voters 
believed in the legitimacy of the new party in part because prominent political 
figures led the movement. The provincial success of its sister party, the PQ, was 
also a factor.51 While the rise of Creditistes required an economic crisis, public 
opinion polls showed that the reason for support of the BQ was largely due to 
longstanding government alienation.52 
Forming a uniquely Quebec party was an interesting experiment in itself 
because, as Bakvis & Macpherson found, Quebec historically voted as a 
48
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"block." Quebec voters had the second strongest electoral cohesion in a 
province (second only to Newfoundland) and were a much better indicator than 
Ontario (the second biggest province) in predicting which party would run the 
government.54 Such research is helpful in explaining Canadian voting behavior 
when one considers that Quebec supported the Liberal party and contributed to 
its dominance for most of the 20th century. When the Quebeckers shifted heavily 
to the Conservatives in the 1980's, Canada had Conservative Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney. This block theory is strengthened by the fact that no significant 
difference existed in voting behavior between Francophones and Anglophones in 
Quebec.55 While the direction of voting amongst Anglophones and Francophones 
deviated since the Bloc Quebecois, it is this distinct voting history that helps 
explain why a party focused solely on the province of Quebec was so successful 
at the federal level.56 
With the Bloc Quebecois surging, the PQ provincial government decided 
to organize another sovereignty referendum in 1995. While the 1980 referendum 
was devastating for the movement, the emergence of the BQ and the failed 
accords were indicators that public sentiment shifted.57 Even though the results 
had in fact indicated a significant change, the separatist movement was handed 
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a crushing blow. The referendum was defeated once again, this time by a margin 
of 50.6%-49.4%.58 Still this result indicated just how tumultuous things had gotten 
in Quebec and why the Bloc's emergence in this period was so logical. While the 
separatist movement was reeling after this result, and the BQ lost the title of 
Official Opposition in the 1997 election, new leader Gilles Duceppe did not allow 
the party to disintegrate. Instead, the Bloc Quebecois followed the example of the 
Parti Quebecois and established a center-left platform that appealed to 
Quebeckers who were moderate and non-sovereigntist as well.59 
Political Survival After the Failed Referendum 
The Bloc Quebecois' platform and strategy following the failed referendum 
was essential to its survival. Since then, rather than fight against the federal 
system, the BQ has adopted the moderate strategy of acting as a standard party 
in Parliament while not abandoning separatist rhetoric.60 By continuing to opt to 
make changes within the system, it had remained politically relevant and 
legitimate. A content analysis of BQ members in the Question Period of the 
House of Commons shows that the Bloc intensifies or tones down its discussion 
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of separatism based upon public opinion within the province at the time. The 
strategy of choosing not to follow the obstructionist example led by the only 
separatist party to be successful, the Sinn Fein in Ireland, was a double edged 
sword.62 The Bloc won victories for Quebec by doing business in a "respectful, 
constructive fashion" which comes at the cost of partially compromising its 
separatist endgame by accepting the legitimacy of Parliament.63 Such successes 
include the increased use of the French language in Parliament and 
disproportionately favorable funding to Quebec.64 The utilization of such 
strategies not only maintains and increases the nationalist sentiment of its 
supporters but also has secured compromise from the federal government, as 
these minor concessions are much less 'dangerous' to Canada as a whole.65 
As much as theory helps us understand why the Bloc Quebecois remains, 
the BQ's regional nature also shatters many longstanding theories used to 
explain Canadian voting behavior. The value of Bakvis & Macpherson's voting 
block theory declined. It asserts that the majority of Quebec voters would predict 
the national government. Yet the Bloc Quebecois won Quebec in all six elections 
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until 2011. However, when one looks at the election results since 1993, it 
appears that Quebec continues to be a vehicle for political change as its voters 
profoundly impact the make-up of the House of Commons. A study by Bastien 
and Loewen is also problematic in understanding Quebec.67 While these scholars 
found a significant correlation between the popular opinion of the party in power 
and how the candidate from that party did in such elections, this effect was 
significantly weaker in Quebec.68 The research linked special election data of 
every contest in the last 45 years and had essentially established a relationship 
of voting for a Conservative or Liberal candidate based upon 
favorable/unfavorable perceptions of those in power. From 1993-2011 the Bloc 
Quebecois had become the main party in Quebec, yet it held a minimal chance 
of ever forming the national government, which makes the government-
opposition party relationship very different. This theory is important in explaining 
by-election behavior. The Bloc Quebecois (and now the NDP) complicated what 
used to be a much simpler, dichotomous Conservative-Liberal relationship.69 The 
Bloc's status as an anomaly among political parties changed the way political 
scientists study federal election behavior across Canada, in part, because it 
encourages them to focus on regional interests as opposed to national parties. 
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The Bloc Quebecois and Liberal Party as the two main parties in the 
province frustrate Cutler's theory of local economic conditions affecting voting 
behavior. Cutler intensively studied two very diverse elections (1993 and 1997) 
as each had a different party in power and a very different economic situation.70 
Across the board, this study indicates that voters would either punish or reward 
the party in power based upon their current economic conditions. Once again, 
the province where this theory weakened was in Quebec due to the Bloc 
Quebecois.71 It is the separatist ideology that complicates this binary way of 
thinking. For many BQ voters, the Liberal and Conservative Parties are one in 
the same due to their federalist perspective on Canadian separatism. In the 2011 
election, evidence presented will suggest that the NDP and Green Party like the 
Bloc Quebecois in become outlets for Quebeckers to show displeasure for the 
Conservative and Liberal Parties. This is addressed below in the second 
hypothesis. 
Platform and Demographics of BQ Voters 
The literature on the Bloc Quebecois also refutes some perceptions about 
the party's platform, influence and voter base. First of all, while BQ supporters 
are predominantly French speaking, the amount of Francophone support 
depends on the particular demographics of the riding. Lublin & Voss provide 
rather convincing evidence that BQ support by Francophones is stronger in 
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culturally homogenous districts as opposed to ones with a mix of English and 
French-speakers.72 They explain this shift based on the 'contact hypothesis' 
which states that an area with a multitude of cultures will be less likely embrace 
separation.73 The cultural diversity of Montreal combined with a significantly 
smaller Francophone to Anglophone ratio contrasted to the rest of province, 
indicates why certain ridings in the city seem unwinnable for the BQ. 
The second myth about the Bloc is that because its base is largely 
Francophone, that it is also composed predominantly of devout Roman 
Catholics. The classic demographic is that Liberals are often Roman Catholic 
and the Conservatives are often Protestant. An obvious consequence of the BQ 
sweeping through Quebec would be the siphoning of Liberal support.74 Yet, 
interestingly enough while the Bloc and Roman Catholicism have the strongest 
party-religion connection in the country, the more devout a Catholic in Quebec is, 
the more likely he/she is to support the Liberal party.75 Therefore conversely, the 
Bloc Quebecois is supported strongly by nominal Roman Catholic voters. 
Ironically, this appears to be a strategic advantage due to the global trend of 
increased secularism, even in Quebec, giving the BQ a demographic edge. In 
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light of the 2011 election, it is also important to note that the NDP has the 
strongest tie to non-religious people.76 
The Bloc Quebecois' anti-war stance is also well-known. The 
Conservatives often scapegoat the BQ for imposing 'undue influence' on 
Canada's involvement in Afghanistan. Yet, statistically, the public opinion on 
Afghanistan in Quebec was and continues to be similar to the majorities in most 
other provinces.77 Therefore, it appears that the Bloc's staunch anti-war stance is 
exaggerated by the Conservatives due to the BQ's strained relationship with the 
rest of Canada.78 Afghanistan is a controversial conflict in many NATO countries 
and therefore the anti-war position supports the Bloc's continued success. The 
Bloc is also known for its negative stance on missile defense. Federal parties, 
including Stephen Harper's Conservatives, are said to "to trim [its] sails in the 
area of defense and security so as not to alienate vote-rich Quebec, which often 
seems out of step with the rest of Canada when it comes to things military."79 
While some Quebec separatists would embrace NORAD and NATO for Quebec 
as an independent country, the near-consensus of the province's voters 
prevented Canada from accepting a continental missile defense system.80 
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The Bloc's stance on defense, combined with the promotion of social 
programs and welfare, put the Bloc in a very advantageous place on the political 
spectrum, to the left of the Liberals and to the right of the NDP.81 BQ support has 
expanded based upon its platform tailored to Quebeckers. MPs have the 
leverage of sacrificing Canada's interests because of uncompromising support of 
the interests of Quebec. Considering the long-standing alienation of the Quebec 
people from the government, it has only helped the Bloc when the Harper 
government alienates voters by singling the BQ out in foreign policy matters.82 
Figure 1: Spectrum of Canadian Political Ideology 83 
(Left) | New Democratic—Bloc Quebecois—Liberal—Conservative | (Right) 
The Quebec Nation 
Whether the Bloc Quebecois resurges or withers away, something that will 
not change is the distinctness of the electorate, the "Quebec nation." Based upon 
its heavily Francophone nature, most Quebeckers view themselves as a distinct 
society from the rest of Canada. While this feeling of distinction leads some to 
desire separatism from the country, many others feel that Quebec should be 
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allowed a certain amount of autonomy as a province. While the Quebec Nation 
has previous longstanding periods of political loyalty, the lesson of federal 
elections is that the Quebec Nation is not afraid to vote out a party if it feels 
betrayed. The Liberal Party's electorate changed after its loss of Quebec seats in 
1984. The Progressive Conservative Party barely held onto its political life after 
being thrown out of Quebec in 1993. The Bloc Quebecois in the 2011 election 
appears to be the latest casualty of the will of the Quebec Nation. 
Death of the BQ? 
After a particular party suffers an embarrassing loss in an election, it is 
tempting to speculate about that party demise. Yet this is usually a rare 
circumstance, especially in Canada. In fact, the only party in recent memory that 
ceased to exist after heavy electoral loss was the Social Credit party. The once-
dominant Liberals declined after the 1984 election based upon the patronage 
scandal and John Turner's non-response to it. Yet, only nine years after their 
worse loss in electoral history, they would find themselves back in power with a 
majority government. The Conservatives suffered the worst electoral loss in 
Canadian history, yet they rose from the ashes to a win in the 2006 election. 
They continue to hold the government to this day. While a definite possibility 
exists that the Bloc Quebecois will cease to be a political force, a prediction of its 
demise may be too hasty. 
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The 2011 Canadian Federal election represented a dramatic shift in 
federal and regional politics. The Conservatives gained a majority in Parliament 
and the New Democratic Party became the Official Opposition. The Liberal Party 
and the Bloc Quebecois hit an all-time low. The majority of the electoral shift in 
the election occurred from the Orange Crush of the NDP in Quebec (with most 
victims being incumbent Bloc Quebecois MPs). Therefore, in order to understand 
the 2011 election, it is vital to understand what exactly happened to the Bloc. 
The NDP surge appears to partially support the theory of "dyadic 
representation" in an SMP parliamentary system.84 It states that MPs not only 
follow party discipline when voting in the House of Commons but that they also 
represent the constituency of the riding that elects them. Research indicates that 
this dyadic relationship is limited in Canada as party discipline reigns supreme. 
However, it is still relevant in the popularity and success of certain Canadian 
politicians.85 This relates to voting behavior in Quebec because it appears that 
MPs were elected for both reasons. While certain NDP MP candidates such as 
Thomas Mulcair, Nycole Turmel and Romeo Saganash enjoy individual 
popularity and have a bond with the people that elected them, it appears that 
many MPs were elected based upon the approval of Jack Layton and the mass 
acceptance of the NDP platform and label. This helps to explain the election of 
the McGill Five and many other NDP freshmen MPs. Ruth Ellen Brosseau may 
be the most pertinent example. Brosseau vacationed in Las Vegas during the 
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campaign cycle and does not speak French fluently.86 This is despite the fact that 
her riding of Berthier-Maskinonge is composed of over 98% francophones.87 
The analysis of the BQ losses also indicates why dyadic representation 
leans in the direction of the party platform and leadership. If there were a large 
constituency connection with the riding and the candidate, then Quebeckers 
likely would not have thrown out so many of their longstanding MPs. Six of them, 
including party leader Gilles Duceppe, were Bloc MPs elected in 1993. 
Meanwhile when you consider the obscure range of NDP candidates elected, 
(described by the Economist as a motley group of students, ex-Communists, 
teachers, activists and a few seasoned politicians) the platforms, perception of 
parties and leadership were much more important to the Quebec electorate.88 
Table 5: Incumbent Bloc MPs who lost in 2011 
Incumbency # of MPs Average Loss Margin 
6-Time 6 14.9% 
5-Time 1 18.2% 
4-Time 4 14.2% 
3-Time 15 17.1% 
2-Time 6 20.0% 
1-Time 8 20.9% 
0-Time 1 17.0% 
Note: This table represents the incumbent BQ MPs who lost re-election in 2011. Only full-terms are 
counted for the purpose of this table, not partial terms due to winning a by-election. All election data 
used is from Elections Canada. 
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While this literature creates a sharper picture of voting tendencies in 
Quebec, this most recent election result leaves many questions unanswered. 
The Bloc Quebecois arose as a unique phenomenon, especially amongst the 
history of separatist or regional parties around the world. Its approach is also 
unique for a separatist party because it advances its interests by working within 
the system rather than protesting against it. Unlike the other three major parties, 
the BQ is not looking for cross-country appeal and has constructed a platform 
tailored to the interests and needs of Quebeckers (Young & Belanger, p.490).89 
These factors kept the BQ as the winner of province of Quebec in its first six 
elections and established it as a mainstay in the House of Commons. 
Research on the Bloc Quebecois is particularly necessary because its 
anomalistic quality has disrupted many longstanding theories on Canadian voting 
behavior.90 We certainly do not have the same system that Cairns was 
disgruntled about as both the Bloc and the NDP have created an 'effective 
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opposition' to the Liberal and Conservative parties. Quebeckers felt alienated by 
the federal government over economic issues during the Quiet Revolution and 
protested the Liberal party by supporting the Creditistes.91 Frustration with the 
federal government combined with the desire for Quebec sovereignty helped 
spawn the first ideological party in the Parti Quebecois.92 The Bloc Quebecois 
used the PQ's model. Its 1993 emergence took over a respectable proportion of 
support in Canada's second most-populous province. Because of the Bloc, it is 
no longer valid to assess the relationship simply between the Liberals and 
Conservatives in general elections or in by-elections in Quebec.93 Nor is it true to 
suggest that Francophones and Roman Catholics automatically support the Bloc, 
as the demographics of the voting base are much more complex.94 
The way that the Bloc Quebecois maintained support from 1993-2008 was 
indeed quite remarkable. Investigating the causes of their sudden downfall is also 
compelling. The easy answer would be to say that Quebeckers just simply are 
tired of separatism and embraced federal Canada. Facts and analysis do not 
endorse this view. The body of literature on Quebec politics explains the 
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continued presence of the Bloc. I will add to this body of literature by providing 
answers to the question of why the Bloc was unsuccessful in the 2011 election. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
The methodology for this thesis integrates both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence into the understanding of this election. Qualitative information from 
newspapers and other periodicals is essential in constructing the context of the 
campaign cycle and the election. Quantitative information from electoral data and 
polling data is essential to tracking the opinions of voters on political parties and 
issues. This two-dimensional approach allows the research to get a more 
complete picture of the election, which in turn creates a better understanding of 
the electoral loss. 
Research Question: What caused the Bloc Quebecois to suffer such heavy 
losses in the 2011 Canadian Federal Election? 
33 
Hypothesis 1 : The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was 
caused by a dramatic shift of voter support in Quebec to the New Democratic 
Party. 
Null Hypothesis 1 : There is no relationship between the Bloc Quebecois loss of 
seats and New Democratic Party's support. 
Hypothesis 2: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was due 
to the spreading of support amongst protest parties in heavily Francophone 
ridings. 
Null Hypothesis 2: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support was not because of the 
spreading of support amongst protest parties in heavily Francophone ridings. 
Hypothesis 3: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was 
caused by particular events in the campaign cycle, including decisions by the 
New Democratic Party and the Bloc Quebecois, particularly leaders Jack Layton 
and Gilles Duceppe. 
Null Hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between Bloc Quebecois support 
and the particular events in the campaign cycle, including decisions made by the 
NDP and BQ, particularly leaders Jack Layton and Gilles Duceppe. 
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Hypothesis 4: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was 
caused by declining support for Quebec separatism. 
Null Hypothesis 4: There is no relationship between Bloc Quebecois support 
and views on separatism 
Hypothesis 5: The loss of Bloc Quebecois support in the 2011 election was 
caused by Canada's use of the Single Member District Plurality System as 
opposed to Proportional Representation. 
Null Hypothesis 5: There is no relationship between Bloc Quebecois support 
and the SMDP system. 
The first hypothesis will look at the effect of the New Democratic Party 
surge in Canada with a particular emphasis on how it affected the losses of seats 
and votes for the Bloc Quebecois in the 2011 election. This will be done using 
Election Canada's electoral data from the 2011 election and previous elections at 
the riding, provincial and national level. The national level statistics will be used 
to understand the NDP surge on a complete scale. This will be then compared 
and contrasted to its impact just on the province of Quebec. Riding-level data are 
used to analyze and determine where the NDP surge took place and whether it 
was localized or widespread within Quebec. 
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The second hypothesis will involve the analysis of both the original and my 
revised version of Lublin and Voss' contact hypothesis. Their research reveals 
that the more homogeneously francophone a riding is, the more likely voters 
there would be to support the Bloc Quebecois. Yet in light of the 2011 election 
result, I will test the contact hypothesis with the support of "protest parties" as 
well as just the Bloc Quebecois. This will be done by analyzing electoral data 
from both the Bloc Quebecois and all Protest Parties and riding Francophone 
statistics from the 2006 Canadian Census. Quantitative data will be obtained 
using single and multiple linear regressions with SPSS. 
The operationalization of Quebec votes is necessary based upon the 
historical disdain that Quebec voters have shown for the Canadian government. 
It is reasonable to assume that if the 2011 election results were simply a 
referendum of the Bloc Quebecois and its decreasing popularity, the Quebec 
voters would turn to the parties that they previously supported, the Conservative 
and Liberal Parties. The New Democratic Party (and its predecessor the Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation) have been in the House of Commons 
nearly a century, but only had one Member of Parliament from Quebec prior to 
2011 (Thomas Mulcair in 2008). Furthermore, the NDP had never held the title of 
the Official Opposition prior to 2011. This means its previous impact in Canadian 
Parliament was severely limited. Maurice Pinard had already labeled the Bloc as 
an ideological party, yet perhaps we should think of them more as a protest 
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party. To be clear, one may define a protest party as one that has yet to form the 
government but has the potential of doing so. 
Every active party that has previously elected an MP in the House of 
Commons except for the Liberals and Conservatives (and their predecessor the 
Progressive Conservatives) falls under this category. Therefore, the second 
prong of this definition is whether this protest party has the ability to elect MPs to 
the House of Commons. The three parties that fall under this definition for the 
2011 election are the Bloc Quebecois, the New Democratic Party, and the Green 
Party.95 While it is certainly debatable whether any of these three parties has the 
potential to form the government, all three have proven themselves to be 
legitimate contenders.96 Canadians have rewarded them with a significant 
percentage of the popular vote. While their ideologies and platforms differ, they 
all share the similarity that their voters would like to see a change in Parliament 
as opposed to the traditional two main parties. 
Due to the toxic relationship between Quebec citizens and the Canadian 
government, it appears vital to analyze how much the citizens still rejected the 
Liberals and Conservatives while at the same time rejecting the Bloc Quebecois. 
Those who stuck with the Bloc certainly are making their voice heard through the 
traditional route. However, a Quebecker's vote for the New Democratic Party or 
95
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the Green Party also signifies that that individual is also looking for change in 
Ottawa. 
The third hypothesis involves important events during the campaign cycle 
leading up to the 2011 election. This section will include quantitative polling data 
from EKOS and Nanos polling to understand popularity and party preference 
over the course of time. It will also provide qualitative evidence from newspaper 
and periodical coverage of the campaign that helps better understand the context 
and the decisions made by both the Bloc and the NDP campaigns, as well as 
how they were perceived. 
The fourth hypothesis involves looking at views of Quebec separatism 
going into and directly after the 2011 election. Angus Reid and NANOS polling 
will be used to get a better understanding of the popular opinion regarding 
separatism. A quantitative comparison will be done between the Bloc Quebecois 
and the Parti Quebecois over this period to look at the differences in support. The 
reasoning behind this is the idea that there are different constituencies (of course 
with a large amount of overlap) for these two parties, based upon how radical 
they are perceived to be and what legislative tools they have at their disposal. 
The fifth hypothesis is a test of Duverger"s Law and will involve an 
analysis of previous election data (obtained from Elections Canada) to look at 
how political parties are influences by the Single Member District Plurality 
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System. The analysis will reach back to the 1993 election with a specific focus on 
the Bloc Quebecois and New Democratic Party. This will be done by making 
calculations that project how electoral results would be different under a system 
of proportional representation. This will be meshed with qualitative historical 
information to examine the Bloc's current and past influence. 
This research certainly possesses more internal validity than external 
validity. Not many situations across the globe exist that are similar to the 
Quebec-Canada relationship. This is largely due to the high concentration and 
population of Francophones within the province. Most separatist elements are 
relatively small groups compared to the country's populace. However, the 
internal validity to this thesis is strong as this is a pressing question to the body of 
literature on Canadian Federal Politics. In particular, this research provides a 
pressing example of how electoral decisions in Quebec shape (and in many 
ways, hold hostage) the structure of the Canadian House of Commons. In order 
to understand the volatility of Canadian elections in the future, this is a question 




Hypothesis 1: The NDP Surge 
In the 2004 Canadian Leaders' Debate, Prime Minister Paul Martin framed 
the debate and claimed that the Canadian people had only two choices to form 
the government in Canada, either the Conservatives or the Liberals. In an almost 
prophetic fashion NDP leader Jack Layton responded to Martin with: "I've got to 
take issue with a claim that you are making. That there are only two parties with 
the capability of governing. What kind of arrogance gives you that kind of 
proposition? You are taking for granted the Canadian people."97 While many 
probably rolled their eyes at Layton's comments when he made them, in just 
seven short years the Canadian people provided Layton's New Democrats with 
the title of Official Opposition. At the same time, they sank the Liberal party to an 
all-time low. 
97
 2004 Canadian Leaders Debate CBCArchives 
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A significant NDP electoral surge occurred in 2011 as it increased its 
percentage of the popular vote and seat total from previous years. The NDP 
topped 30% of the national popular vote for the first time in their history. The 
party also improved its popular vote in all provinces and territories except for the 
territory of Nunavut and province of Newfoundland & Labrador. However, one 
major shift came from the province of Quebec as the NDP increased its share of 
the vote from 12.2% in 2008 to a whopping 42.9% in 2011. Conversely, the Bloc 
Quebecois only received 23.4% of the vote in Quebec with its previous low mark 
being 37.9% in 1997. Therefore, without Quebec drastically shifting its support in 
2011 it would be reasonable to suggest that the NDP would continue to have its 
"third party curse" and the Bloc Quebecois would have maintained the level of 
seats and support that it had grown accustomed to over the years.98 
98
 Mavrikkou, M. (2009). "The NDP and the Third Party Curse in Canada." University of Waterloo 
Publications p 4. 
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Note: This table represents the seat totals for the NDP in the 2008 and 2011 elections with the third 
column showing the net gains/losses of seats for each province/territory. All election data used is from 
Elections Canada. 
The actual seat totals by the NDP show that a definite correlation exists 
between seats and the popular vote. While small gains were made in multiple 
provinces, the big difference was the 58 seats that the NDP picked up in Quebec. 
No other party was able to gain a seat in Quebec that it had not previously held 
in 2008. While the Bloc was certainly the most affected as it lost 45 of the 49 
ridings that it held in 2008, the Liberals and Conservatives lost a combined 13 of 
25 seats to the NDP wave. 
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Note: This table represents the partisan changes in Quebec's 75 House of Commons Seats. A riding gained 
indicates that the party won a seat that it did not have in 2008. A riding held means that the party won 
the seat in both 2008 and 2011. A riding lost means that the party held the seat in 2008 but lost it in 2011. 
All election data used is from Elections Canada. 
While the 2011 election in Quebec showed that the Bloc Quebecois was 
completely overwhelmed by the New Democratic Party's "Orange Crush," it is not 
the only conclusion that should be drawn. The Bloc Quebecois had the most to 
lose as it held a majority of Quebec seats in the House of Commons and were 
only able to hang on to four of their ridings. However, the Liberals and 
Conservatives too, suffered major blows to their presence in Quebec. In fact all 
Bloc Quebecois candidates, all but eight Conservatives, and all but one Liberal 
candidates running in 2011 received a lower percentage of the vote compared to 
their totals in 2008 in the province." 
Based upon the election statistics in 2011, it is clear that the NDP surge 
significantly hurt the Bloc Quebecois. Voters abandoned the Bloc in great 
numbers but did not run back to their former keepers, the Liberals and 
99
 Out of the 225 Bloc, Liberal and Conservative candidates in Quebec, there were nine who performed 
better in ridings from 2008 to 2011: Conservative Minister of Industry Christian Paradis (Megantic-
L'Erable), Conservative Minister of State Dennis Lebel (Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean) failed candidates Liberal 
Claude Morin (Beauce), Conservative Larry Smith (Lac-Saint-Louis), Conservative Bernard Genereux 
(Montmagny—L'lslet—Kamouraska—Riviere-Du-Loup), Conservative Saulie Zajdel (Mount Royal), 
Conservative Agop Evereklian (Pierrefonds-Dollard), Conservative Dennis Galiatsatos (Saint-Laurent— 
Cartierville), Conservative Neil Drabkin (Westmount—Ville-Marie). Full data available in Appendix A. 
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Conservatives. Instead, Jack Layton's NDP, the leftist party that was fresh and 
untested in the province, became the beneficiary of the will of the Quebec Nation. 
Based upon this electoral data I reject the null hypothesis, as it appears that the 
NDP surge partially caused the BQ's loss of seats. With this relationship 
established we can now investigate the remaining four, more complex 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2: The Modified Contact Hypothesis 
As we have seen, the contact hypothesis suggested by Lublin and Voss 
appears to be relatively accurate when assessing the Bloc Quebecois support in 
the 2004, 2006 and 2008 federal elections. The eight ridings (Lotbiniere— 
Chutes-de-la-Chaudiere, Levis—Bellechasse, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-
Charles, Megantic—L'Erable, Jonquiere—Alma, Louis-Saint-Laurent, Portneuf— 
Jacques-Cartier, Beauport-Limolou) that have over 95% Francophones, shifted 
from supporting the Bloc Quebecois in 2006 to supporting the Conservative 
party. This is explained by the voters choosing a viable ideological alternative in 
Stephen Harper's revived Conservative Party. In addition, Quebec separatism at 
that time did not appear to be as salient as in the 1990's. 
Despite the Conservative encroachments in Quebec, the contact 
hypothesis appears to be valid: the more homogenously francophone a riding is, 
the more likely it is to support the Bloc Quebecois. A regression on the electoral 
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data from 2004-2011, showed that the Francophone percentage of a riding is 
statistically significant in relation to voting for the Bloc. Despite a definite 
decrease in this percentage for the 2011 election, the contact hypothesis is still 
statistically robust. Therefore, despite the massive loss in the number of seats, 
Lublin and Voss' contact hypothesis is still helps explain Francophone voting 
behavior. 































Note: This table represents the data from a linear regression done with the independent variable being 
the amount of Francophones in a riding and the dependent variables being the percentage of the popular 
vote that the BQ gained in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011. The Francophone statistics are from the 2006 
Canadian Census' report of French being a home language for each riding. All election data used is from 
Elections Canada. Refer to Appendix B for the full data set. 
Despite this consistency in the legitimacy of the contact hypothesis, the 
francophone population certainly went in a different direction in 2011. As 
discussed in Hypothesis 1, this direction was not towards the Bloc, nor was it 
towards the Liberals and Conservatives. Francophone Quebeckers have felt 
varying levels of alienation from the Canadian government throughout its history, 
and clearly mistrust the two traditional parties. Therefore, it is relevant to revise 
the contact hypothesis to state that the more homogenously Francophone a 
riding is, the more likely it is to support a protest party (The Bloc, the NDP or the 
Green Party). 
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Note: This table represents the data from a linear regression done with the independent variable being 
the amount of Francophones in a riding and the dependent variables being the percentage of the popular 
vote that protest parties gained in 2004,2006, 2008 and 2011. Protest Parties for this statistical test was 
the combined totals of the Bloc Quebecois, the New Democratic Party, and the Green Party. The 
Francophone statistics are from the 2006 Canadian Census' report of French being a home language for 
each riding. All election data used is from Elections Canada. Refer to Appendix B for the full data set. 
The analysis of this revised contact hypothesis also is statistically 
significant. While the numbers are slightly lower than they are for the original 
contact hypothesis, this provides a strong explanation of Francophone voting 
behavior. The statistical relationship became slightly stronger in 2011 as the 
original became slightly weaker. Therefore, while the BQ was decimated, the 
Francophone Quebeckers continued their support of protest parties. While a 
large amount of Francophones decided in 2011 that the New Democratic Party 
was a better option than the Bloc Quebecois, one thing remains the same: the 
Quebec Nation is not endorsing Canada's ruling parties and seeks an alternative. 
Canadian federal politics are increasingly volatile in the past three 
decades. The 2011 election was unprecedented as it signaled major declines of 
two political parties, the Bloc and the Liberals, while elevating the consummate 
minor third party, the New Democratic Party, to the Official Opposition. Yet there 
were two previous federal elections indicating an unstable political environment. 
In 1984, Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives crushed the Liberals who 
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had dominated most of the 20 century. The same Progressive Conservative 
party was handily defeated (with the NDP taking a sizable loss) in the 1993 
election due to resurgence of the Liberals, as well as the emergence of the Bloc 
Quebecois and the Reform Party. 
While the results of these three elections had a lot to do with the national 
electorate, it is interesting to note just how influential Quebec was in all three 
outcomes. Mulroney won the hearts of Quebeckers in 1984 enough to persuade 
them to throw out the only federal party they supported, the Liberals. Yet, the 
Progressive Conservatives would end up failing in many ways. They fragmented 
by 1993, with many Western conservatives joining the Reform Party and Quebec 
MPs leaving to join with Liberal MPs to form the Bloc Quebecois. In all, 53% of 
the Progressive Conservative new seats in 1984 and 37% of their lost seats in 
1993 came from Quebec.100 
Further evidence supports the revised contact hypothesis, that Quebec 
was the only province to deviate from national election trends in 2011. Stephen 
Harper's attainment of a majority government was helped by Conservative 
candidates received an increase of the popular vote in 205 of 307 ridings. Jack 
Layton's New Democrat surge amounted to 291 candidates receiving an 
increase in the popular vote. The Liberal decline was marked by only 21 
candidates receiving an increase in support. 
100
 Ironically one of the two members of the Progressive Conservative caucus to survive the 1993 election 
was Jean Charest who is currently the leader of the provincial Liberal Party and serves as the Premier of 
Quebec. 
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Table 11: Total and Quebec Seat Changes in "Watershed Elections" 











































Note: This table represents the seat changes in 1984,1993 and 2011 at both the national level and in the 
province of Quebec. All election data used is from Elections Canada. 
. Quebec followed the rest of Canada in propelling the NDP and shunning 
the Liberals but only increased its support for 8 out of 75 Conservative 
candidates. This deviation from the national trend seems quite peculiar (Also 
refer to Appendix D). While Quebec voters' ideological position may be a factor in 
this phenomenon, this explanation has limitations. It is the same province that 
once overwhelmingly supported Brian Mulroney. It also appears that Quebec 
rejects the two main parties to a greater extent than the rest of the provinces do. 
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Note: This table represents the changes in partisan support from 2008 to 2011 at the riding level. The 
amount of ridings in the "Up" column signifies how many had an increase in the popular vote for that 
particular party. The amount of ridings in the "Down" column signifies how many had a decrease in the 
popular vote for that particular party. All election data used is from Elections Canada. Refer to Appendix E 
for a full riding-by-riding list. 
Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis in this case as well. The loss in BQ 
seats was not due to a decrease in the support of protest parties. Instead, this 
support increased as the popular vote for both the Liberals and Conservatives 
decreased in the province. But the protest vote was spread out and favored the 
NDP instead of the Bloc, which had traditionally relied on this support. The 
contact hypothesis is still relevant when broadening it to include protest parties, 
rather than just the Bloc. 
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Hypothesis 3: Campaign Decisions And Events 
Leadership of Gilles Duceppe 
While Lucien Bouchard was the powerful, credible figure to get the Bloc 
Quebecois off the ground (being a former Conservative minister under PM Brian 
Mulroney), Gilles Duceppe should receive most of the credit for maintaining the 
support of the BQ from the 1997 election to the 2008 election. Yet, many 
question whether Duceppe had the energy that the campaign needed in 2011. 
The wear and tear would not be surprising considering Duceppe is the fifth 
longest-serving party leader in Canadian history. Approval of Duceppe's handling 
of the party was compromised when considering that a long-standing Bloc MP 
like Louis Plamondon survived re-election while Duceppe was beaten handily in 
the Laurier-Saint-Marie riding. This was the same riding that made him the first 
ever Bloc MP to win an election back in 1990. While the status of dyadic 
representation leaning towards the party rather than the individual, the loss of a 
party leader in his/her own riding is telling. Duceppe and Ignatieff losing in their 
respective "safe ridings" of Laurier—Saint-Marie and Etobicoke-Lakeshore were 
major indicators of campaign failure. 
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Table 13: Longest Tenure For Party Leaders 
Leader Party Tenure Years in Office 
Wilfred Laurier Liberal 1887-1919 32 
William McKenzie King Liberal 1919-1948 29 
John Macdonald Conservative 1867-1891 24 
Pierre Trudeau Liberal 1968-1984 16 
EdBroadbent New Democrat 1975-1989 14 
Gilles Duceppe Bloc Quebecois 1997-2011 14 
Note: This table shows the six longest tenured party leaders in Canada's history. Data was from the 
Parliament of Canada's Website. 
When considering the amount of time and effort that Duceppe put into the 
Bloc Quebecois and the relative ease that most Bloc MPs had in getting elected, 
it seems very plausible that the BQ under Duceppe's leadership could start the 
campaign lacking energy. Polling did not help this complacency. At the start of 
the campaign, EKOS projected the Bloc gaining seats and referring to Duceppe 
as the only opposition leader "looking good" going into dissolution of Parliament. 
While the BQ did lose a bit of ground to the Conservatives in the 2006 Election, 
there were no serious threats to its legitimacy since its first appearance in 1993, 
despite the crushing loss in the sovereignty referendum of 1995. 
Before he knew it, Duceppe was blindsided by Layton in Quebec. Based 
upon similar liberal ideologies and never campaigning against one another in the 
past, Duceppe had often referred to Layton as 'my friend Jack.' Yet, it appeared 
at every turn it was the charismatic figure of Layton in Quebec that gave 
Quebeckers confidence in the NDP. Duceppe looked run-down in comparison. 
One good example is when Duceppe made a popular political move by calling for 
the postponement of the French language debate scheduled on the same night 
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as the Montreal Canadiens NHL playoff game.101 Layton echoed this sentiment 
and further claimed that if he wasn't involved in the election he would probably 
want to watch the hockey game over the debate.102 Layton then boosted his 
image by being the only leader in attendance. Layton, the Montreal native, 
became the topic of discussion in Quebec when an iconic photograph surfaced of 
him in a Canadiens' jersey hoisting a pint amongst Canadien fans. Soon Layton 
would be regarded as the most popular party leader in Quebec.103 
Based upon the increased popularity of Layton in Quebec, the NDP 
shifted campaign resources to the province. The NDP had never mounted a 
legitimate campaign in Quebec, as it was a party that originated in Western 
Canada and has maintained a staunch federalist attitude. Yet Layton's message 
of "higher corporate taxes, more social spending, and a withdrawal of Canadian 
troops from Afghanistan resonated in pacifist, big-government Quebec."104 The 
NDP was starting to make small gains into a province that it had hardly tapped in 
the past. 
101
 La Haye, Dominique (2011, Apr 10). "Habs fever prompts debate date change." Toronto Sun. 
10? 
Dowd, A. (2011, Apr 10). "Canada's Love of Hockey Trumps Election Debate." Reuters. 
103
 According to NANOS on April 12th Jack Layton scored 73.2% on their Leadership Index in Quebec. 
Stephen Harper scored 57.7%, Gilles Duceppe 48.2%, Michael Ignatieff 41.9% and Elizabeth May 5.5% 
104
 (2011, Apr 28). "Canada's General Election and The Elusive Majority." The Economist. 
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Note: This table shows the series of EKOS polling seat projections that start from before the dissolution of 
Parliament to the 2011 election. EKOS "offers seat projections based on its opinion polling. The 
projections are based on regional and, in some cases, sub-regional polling projected onto the results of 
the last election. They do not pretend to predict individual ridings." 
T h e May 1 figures are a range of seats predicted as opposed to a single number. 
**The May 2 figures are the actual election results. 
In what became the turning point of the election, Gilles Duceppe decided 
to respond to the decline in support with a political power play. He enlisted the 
support of high-profile former and current Parti Quebecois members. These 
"hard-core sovereigntists" included the bombastic and controversial former 
Premier of Quebec Jacques Perizeau, the current leader of the PQ Pauline 
Marois and activist Gerald Larose.105 Instead of stopping the slow bleeding of 
Bloc Quebecois support, the measure appeared to open the wound as the 
corresponding EKOS seat projection dropped from 32 seats to 14 in a matter of 
just four days. 
105 Chung, A. (2011, May 3). "Duceppe Resigns as Bloc Quebecois Drowns in an Orange Tsunami." Toronto 
Star. 
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Duceppe's fatal error appeared to be his overt attempt to appeal to the 
militant separatists. By doing so, he alienated moderates who either supported 
the Bloc based upon its platform or those who merely felt that Quebec should be 
granted a special status. Duceppe's approach to make the election in Quebec a 
referendum on sovereignty was clear when he said, "For Quebec, the federal 
election is not a choice between left and right. The choice of Quebeckers is 
between parties for whom it's Canada first, and a party for whom it's Quebec 
before all."106 Such a statement resonated in the Lucien Bouchard era when 
tension in Quebec was at its height. Yet, Duceppe's "born-again separatist" 
rhetoric abandoned and contradicted the 'big-tent' base of Quebec autonomists 
and separatists that he had created in his tenure.107 The alienation of voters by 
the Bloc worsened when activist Gerald Larose referred to Layton as a fake and 
a scoundrel, in a time when Layton was the most popular leader in the province 
and the country. 
Jack Layton's unfortunate and untimely death does give us insight on just 
how instrumental his leadership was on the NDP success in the 2011 election. 
During the election cycle Jack Layton easily surpassed all other leaders 
(including Prime Minister Harper) in popularity, not only in Quebec but 
nationwide. This popularity stayed consistent after Layton's ascension to the 
leader of the opposition and through the remainder of the parliament session. 
Almost immediately after Layton's death in August, the approval of the NDP 
106
 Chung, A. (2011, May 3). "Duceppe Resigns as Bloc Quebecois Drowns in an Orange Tsunami." Toronto 
Star. 
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 Wells, P. (2011, May 16). "The Orange Wave Rises." Maclean's. 
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leadership dropped back to pre-campaign levels (Figure 2). This is despite NDP 
interim leader Nycole Turmel being Layton's handpicked successor. While there 
were certainly Quebec NDP candidates that enjoyed popularity on the individual 
level, this data strengthens the hypothesis that Quebec was voting based upon 
its approval of Jack Layton, his platform, and his campaign.108 Despite a member 
from Quebec being chosen to replace him, it appears voters thought of Jack 
Layton as irreplaceable. Before interim leader Turmel even had a chance to 
show competence, voters had already soured on the NDP. 
Figure 2: CTV/Globe/Nanos Leadership Data 
>»o ® NANOS 
Stephen Harper Ben K M Nvcoit Turme! cotes DiKfppc Uiaabemnoy 
Note: This figure represents CTV/Globe/Nanos polling on Canadian Leadership from February 2008 to 
October 2011. The poll had been conducted weekly during this period through phone interviews with 
randomly selected Canadians. Questions assessed the leadership qualities of each party leader on three 
main aspects: Trust, Competence, and a Vision for Canada. From this data, Nanos developed a leadership 
index score, displayed above. In case this figure is difficult to see in grayscale, the following lines top to 
bottom (using the Feb2008 point): Stephen Harper (Conservative), Jack Layton/Nicole Turmel (NDP), 
Dion/lgnatieff/Rae (Liberal), Elizabeth May (Green), and Gilles Duceppe (BQ). 
One good example of a NDP Quebec member enjoying a great deal of individual popularity is Romeo 
Saganash. Saganash is a local Cree leader representing the riding of Abitibi—Baie-James—Nunavik— 
Eeyou, which is known for its indigenous population. 
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Lack of a polarizing issue? 
The Bloc Quebecois lost support after the 1995 referendum as the Bloc 
lost seats in both the 1997 and the 2000 federal elections. In 2004, the Bloc 
resurged, for reasons unrelated to separatism. The Bloc played an instrumental 
role in starting to uncover the Liberal Sponsorship scandal.109 By the 2006 
election, pressure had really mounted on the Liberals as the scandal reached 
Prime Minister Paul Martin. While the Bloc did lose seats to the Conservatives in 
Quebec City, many felt the party spearheaded the uncovering of the Liberal 
scandal and was rewarded with another strong mandate of 51 seats. In 2008, 
Stephen Harper made some disparaging remarks about cutting major 
government funding of the arts, a major issue for Quebeckers.110 The Bloc used 
this as a defining issue in the campaign and once again rewarded with a majority 
(49) of Quebec seats. 
Polling proved a liability for Gilles Duceppe and his campaign strategy. As 
the only leader of an opposition party to have a high approval rating after the 
dissolution of Parliament, he had reason not to be too concerned about the 
upcoming election. This was probably natural when considering that the Bloc 
Quebecois had a solid and steady performance in all six general elections that it 
had participated in. In hindsight, this passive and lackluster start out of the gates 
directly led to the opportunist Layton stealing the spotlight in the province. 
109
 Dyck, R. (2008). Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches pp 392. 
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Meanwhile the 'panic in the Bloc camp' led to moving from "relative calm and a 
quasi-absence of talk on the Bloc's founding principle -sovereignty- to an all-out 
frontal assault with all sovereigntist guns firing."111 
While the provincial Parti Quebecois is generally regarded as the sister 
party to the federal Bloc Quebecois, the conclusion drawn from this election is 
that the Bloc continued success was by adopting a more moderate route than its 
principal counterpart, the PQ had. The Bloc is a federal party that advocates for 
Quebec. Its main goal is separatism. Yet, it is essentially powerless to achieve 
this goal in the House of Commons. Both the 1980 and the 1995 referendums on 
sovereignty were sponsored by the Parti Quebecois when it held power of the 
Quebec National Assembly. Another indication that the provincial government is 
the true vehicle for separation was the speculation that the well-respected 
Duceppe would take over the PQ after the 2011 election. 

















































Note: This table represents EKOS polling of party preference for decided voters in the province of Quebec 
for the 6 weeks prior to the 2011 election. 
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When looking at the electoral success of the BQ and the PQ since 1993, 
there is not a direct relationship of support. While the federal and provincial 
elections take place at different times, it is the same electorate. It appears that 
Quebec voters have different views of the BQ and PQ. Because of the Bloc 
serving as more of an active advocate of Quebec with no real ability to achieve 
separation, it makes sense that they receive the support of those who desired for 
special status for Quebec, as well as those who simply want to see Quebec 
better represented in the House of Commons. 














































Note: This table represents the electoral success of both the federal Bloc Quebecois and provincial Parti 
Quebecois since 1989 in terms of percentage of the popular vote and seats won. All electoral data used is 
from Elections Canada. 
Second Choice Voting and the Open Letter 
As Black illustrated in his multi-candidate calculus of voting, a voter's 
second-choice party can be critical in multiparty elections. Despite considering 
themselves a member of a particular party, voters may often pick a second 
choice if they feel that they can get that party elected or prevent another party 
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from getting elected.112 The data of second-choice parties in Quebec status 
during the final week of the campaign cycle is telling. While the data does appear 
to follow the ideological spectrum for the three main parties (Conservative voters 
would choose the Liberals as their second-choice, Liberals would choose either 
Conservatives or NDPers), the surprising statistic lies with the Bloc Quebecois 
voters. 62.5% of Bloc voters viewed the NDP as their second-choice. 
Furthermore, the Bloc had by far the lowest amount of "hard-core" voters who 
declared that they had no second choice at a lowly 5.2%. 
Table 17: Quebec Second Choice Parties in 2011 






























Note: This graph represents CTV/Globe/Nanos polling on second-choice electoral preferences in the week 
prior to the 2011 election. The columns represent party identification of the voter with the percentages 
being the second choice of those particular voters for the party listed on the left. 
Just three days before the election, two former Bloc members, Maxime 
Bellerose and Benoit Demuy, released an open letter. They hoped to persuade 
second-choice voters to vote for the NDP.113 Their main contention is that the 
Bloc mutated and is out of touch with its base and would not be able to grant the 
ultimate goal of separation. On the other hand, Jack Layton not only had a 
platform of social justice with which Quebeckers could agree, but the NDP also 
Black, J. (1978). "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." 
American Journal of Political Science, 22 (3) p 631. 
113
 The translated open letter is in Appendix E. 
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represented the best chance for Canada to break the cycle of Stephen Harper's 
Conservative minority governments. Although the goal of unseating Harper as 
Prime Minister was not completed, it appears that the NDP benefitted from many 
last-minute Quebec votes, which propelled the party to its lopsided victory. 
Ultimately, the data presented in this section suggests that the lead up to 
this major change occurred in the legally mandated six-week campaign cycle, not 
between 2008 and 2011. The image and message of Jack Layton resonated with 
Quebec voters while the image and message of Gilles Duceppe seemed tired, 
then erratic, and finally undesirable. By clinging to the PQ for support, the BQ 
alienated most of its moderate voters. Furthermore, it appears that many heeded 
the words of Bellerose and Demuy and chose the NDP as a second choice. 
The quantitative and qualitative data presented in this section mean that I 
reject the null hypothesis. In fact, this particular cause seems to have the 
strongest relationship with the Bloc losing seats. Especially when considering 
that the Bloc's downfall (according to polls) only occurred during the 6 week 
campaign cycle. Duceppe's campaign strategies led to second choice voting and 
the alienation of moderate sovereigntists with Jack Layton and his aggressive 
campaign strategy being the beneficiary. 
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Hypothesis 4: Separatism 
Polling data indicates that the preference for Quebec separatism stabilized 
just below the levels of the failed 1995 referendum.114 Yet, this does not mean 
that Quebec is satisfied with the federal government by any means. However, it 
appears that Quebec voters emphatically supported separatism in the period 
where the federal government had 'failed' in Meech Lake and Charlottetown. 
Aside from the base of the militant separatists (typically synonymous with the PQ 
base), the 1990's were a time where moderates were frustrated and passionate. 
As time progressed and emotions cooled, moderates went back to their beliefs 
that Quebec should be recognized as a distinct society and/or that they should 
receive a certain amount of autonomy from the Canadian government. 
The Parti Quebecois' has continued to advocate for separatism although 
the party's perceived decline is essentially conditional. A poll by Leger Marketing 
showed that support depends upon the leader at the time of election. Under 
current leader Pauline Marois the party would only receive 20% of the vote. If 
Gilles Duceppe were to take the reins, the PQ would receive support 37% of 
Quebeckers.115 Meanwhile, directly after the 2011 election, another Leger 
marketing poll showed that the support for separatism remained around 40%. 
Martin, P. (2011, May 12) Sovereignty Movement is Down But Not Out. Toronto Star. 
115
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Therefore, no change in the level of attachment to Canada affected the results of 
the election.116 
Gilles Duceppe estimated in a 2010 interview that he felt 40% of 
Quebeckers were separatists, 40% were federalist and that 20% were 
moderates.117 A 2009 Angus Reid Poll in provides a detailed picture of where 
Quebecker sentiment lies on issues involving Quebec. While a heavy majority 
believe that Quebec is a distinct society and needs more autonomy, the question 
of separatism is muddled in this 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 situation. While the inflamed 
tensions of the early 90's resulted in nearly a majority of Quebeckers wanting to 
separate from the rest of Canada, since that time, separatism levels are relatively 
stable. 
Table 18: Quebeckers views on Distinctness 
Belief % of Quebeckers 
Quebec Is a Distinct Society 82% 
Quebec Needs More Autonomy 79% 
Quebec Has Enough Sovereignty 32% 
Quebec Should Separate from Canada 28% 
Quebec Needs More Sovereignty But Should Remain in Canada 30% 
If Referendum Was Held Today: Would Vote Yes 40% 
If Referendum Was Held Today: Would Vote No 41 % 
If Referendum Was Held Today: Undecided 19% 
Believe Quebec Will Separate One Day 20% 
Note: This table represents Angus Reid polling of Quebecers on various views involving 
sovereignty/separatism. This poll was conducted with internet-based interviews on June 12 2009. 
117 
' Martin, P. (2011, May 12). "Sovereignty Movement is Down But Not Out." Toronto Star. 
Geddes, J. (2010, May 31). "Is The Bloc Good For Canada?" Maclean's. 
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One must make important distinctions when evaluating the impact of 
separatism on the electoral support for the Bloc Quebecois. The Bloc Quebecois 
formed as a federal political party in order to advocate separation of Quebec from 
Canada (or at least some special autonomy) due to the Canadian Federal 
Government's perceived inabilities to meet the needs and demand of the Quebec 
Nation. Yet, we see over time that the Bloc worked tirelessly within the House of 
Commons in order to attempt to achieve its ideological goals. Furthermore, in 
order to obtain political legitimacy the Bloc created a broad platform and 
advocates for many types of issues in Parliament. Thus, the Bloc in 2006 was 
tremendously different from its single-issue nature under the leadership of Lucien 
Bouchard in the early 1990's. Due to the diverse base that the Bloc Quebecois 
attracts, it is important not to think of the separatist movement and the Bloc 
Quebecois as interchangeable. 
While the two parties were founded based upon the same ideology and 
look to receive electoral support from the same populace, they have two distinct 
objectives. The Parti Quebecois seeks support in the Quebec National Assembly 
so that it can help steer Quebec to separation from the rest of Canada by 
persuading the Quebec population to vote for the measure in a referendum. 
While the Bloc would support this action (and did support the failed 1995 
referendum) its job as a federal party is to advocate for Quebec's interests at the 
federal level. In addition, it exists to persuade the rest of the country that an 
autonomous partnership between Quebec and Canada would make sense. 
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In the wake of the devastation of the Bloc Quebecois, the Parti Quebecois 
finds itself in an increasingly difficult situation. The province now appears to be 
courted by another well-respected and opportunistic politician, former PQ 
minister Francois Legault. Legault is on the verge of forming a new-centre right 
party, which is committed to put aside the separatism issue, is leading polls in the 
province. It appears that this is a filling of a void left by a tired Liberal 
government, a reeling Parti Quebecois and a near-dead right-leaning Action 
democratique du Quebec (ADQ). Polling suggests a spike in support for the far-
left Quebec Solidaire. This party only holds one seat in the Quebec National 
Assembly.118 Yet, based upon the new poll regarding Duceppe's leadership, the 
Parti Quebecois popularity has just as much to do with leadership as it does with 
separatism. The PQ would form the government if Duceppe took the reins of the 
party (37%), but it would do significantly worse if it stays under the leadership of 
Marois (20%).119 
Two logical conclusions can be drawn from these particular events. First, 
the loss of the Bloc Quebecois precipitated the free fall of the Parti Quebecois. 
This relationship is not mutually exclusive as the BQ would not necessarily be 
affected by a decline in PQ support. The Bloc previously maintained its support 
despite Parti Quebecois ebbs and flows. This is due to support of moderate 
118
 Rashi, R. (2011). "Bloc Crushed, PQ In Crisis, The Left Resurgent: Whither Quebec?" Canadian 
Dimension, 45 (5) p 6. 
119
 Muise, M. (2011, Oct 30) "Only Gilles Duceppe Could Defeat Francois Legault: Poll." The Montreal 
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voters who know that the Bloc lacks the power to undertake actual separatist 
action. Meanwhile it is much easier to argue that voting for a PQ candidate is an 
active vote for Quebec separatism. The second conclusion is that Quebeckers 
are as interested in governmental change as they are with ideology. The Federal 
NDP seems like a logical fit for Quebec based upon ideology while this new 
provincial party would be more of a stretch (except for pockets within Quebec 
City).120 Both parties bring forth new ideas and have the ability to usher out 
parties that have disappointed them in the past. 
In this case, I fail to reject the null hypothesis. It does not appear that 
views on separatism played a major factor in the BQ losing seats. While the Bloc 
is predicated upon separatism, it has no ability to conduct serious actions like 
holding a referendum, which attracts moderates. The polling data showed that 
Quebec still holds the same opinions about separatism that it has had over the 
past 15 years. Therefore the Bloc may have ultimately hurt itself by appearing 
'too separatist' for its electorate. 
Hypothesis 5: SMDP vs. Proportional System 
Alan Cairns' research unveiled perceived flaws in the first-past-the-post 
single member district plurality system by showing that the Liberal and 
120
 In the 2006 election, a rejuvenated Conservative Party took multiple ridings in Quebec City from the 
Bloc Quebecois. 
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Conservative Parties both enjoyed inflated majorities with seats compared to the 
percentage of the popular vote. In addition to the two main parties, third parties 
had a much better chance of obtaining seats if they had strong regional/sectional 
support as opposed to parties that has low, nationwide support. Cairns' solution 
to remedying this problem was to propose a system of proportional 
representation so that each individual vote will carry more weight in affecting the 
makeup of the Canadian House of Commons. 
When observing the results of all seven elections in which the Bloc 
Quebecois participated, it appears clear that Cairns' theory is spot on. The 
Liberal majority governments of 1993 and 1997, the Liberal minority governments 
of 2000 and 2004, the Conservative minority governments of 2006 and 2008 and 
the Conservative majority government of 2011 all obtained a higher percentage 
of seats than their percentage of the popular vote. The most exaggerated 
example of this took place in the 1993 election when the Liberals won 60% of the 
seats in Parliament with only 41% of the vote. 
Cairns' assertion about third parties also appears to be true from 1993-
2008. The Bloc Quebecois received an inflated number of seats in all six 
elections. In fact, over that time, the Bloc would obtain an average of 13.5 fewer 
seats in Parliament under proportional representation. Meanwhile, two other 
major parties, the New Democratic Party and the Green Party, were subjected to 
a disproportionately lower number of seats due to national, yet low overall, 
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support. Under proportional representation the Green Party would have had a 
seat in Parliament as early as 1997 and would have rivaled the Bloc Quebecois 
in support in 2008 (the Green Party would've had 21 seats while the Bloc 
would've had 31). Yet, with the SMDP system, it was not until the 2011 election 
until the Green Party won its first seat. Meanwhile the New Democratic Party had 
been around since the 1930's, and due to the SMDP system, mired in a "third-
party curse."121 In 1997, 2004, 2006 and 2008, the New Democratic Party 
garnered a higher percentage of the popular vote than the Bloc. However, it did 
not even come close in obtaining a similar number of seats. 
Another trend that appeared in the past few decades (due to the electoral 
paradigm shifts beginning in the 1980's) is a political party's decline being 
hastened by the SMDP system. The best example of this is in the 1993 election 
with the Progressive Conservative party. While it is not disputed that the once-
prominent governing party was on a sharp decline, it still managed to receive 
over 16% of the popular vote nationwide (which was more than the Bloc popular 
vote). Despite a sizable share of the vote, the PCs went from 169 seats to just 2. 
Under proportional representation, the voters' message to the Progressive 
Conservatives would still be loud and clear as that party would have lost 121 
seats in Parliament, but not the apocalyptic 167 seats it actually did lose. 
Mavrikkou, M. (2009) ."The NDP and the Third Party Curse in Canada." University of Waterloo 
Publications, p 4. 
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Note: This table is the calculation of what the projected number of seats would be under a proportional 
representation system along with the actual seats won in the SMDP system. All electoral data used is from 
Elections Canada. 
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Ironically, it was the Bloc that became a victim of the single member riding 
system in 2011. Despite registering its lowest share of the vote in party history, 
the Bloc Quebecois would have won 19 seats under proportional representation 
as opposed to the mere 4 seats that it did win. Meanwhile, the NDP's gains were 
relatively proportional to the popular vote. This seat/vote ratio for is hugely 
disproportional in Quebec. The NDP accumulated 79% of the Quebec seats 
despite only getting 42.9% of the Quebec vote. Meanwhile the Bloc gained 23% 
of the vote but only received 5% of Quebec's seats. Therefore, while the Bloc 
was disproportionately favored for the first six elections in which it had 
participated in, a hypothetical analysis of a proportional system reveals that the 
BQ would have maintained its solid support in all seven elections, even despite 
the 2011 drop. 
Under the proportional system, the Bloc Quebecois would continue to 
have a solid influence on the political process. This is because Stephen Harper's 
Conservatives would not have won an outright majority and fail to do so for the 
third straight election. The outcome would be an embarrassing one for the Prime 
Minister and it would surely have conjured up the possibility of a minority coalition 
forming a government.122 This would seem even more possible considering it 
would still be Jack Layton and the leftist NDP as the Official Opposition as 
opposed to the centrist Liberals who carry serious baggage. The Conservatives 
The possibility of a coalition government was heavily discussed leading up to the 2011 as pollsters did 
not project the Conservatives to win a majority. 
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successfully fended off a government-toppling coalition in December 2008 by 
framing the NDP and Liberals as plotting with the Quebec separatists. It may not 
be as easy to prevail a second time. An NDP/Liberal coalition could avoid formal 
BQ support, but, in this particular scenario, they would need to appease both the 
Bloc and the Green Party in order to stave off any Conservative non-confidence 
motion.123 Regardless of the potential situation that would have ensued after the 
2011 federal election in a proportional system, the Bloc Quebecois would still be 
very alive and relevant with 19 seats in the House of Commons. 
The dramatic paradigm shifts that occurred in the 1984, 1993 and 2011 
elections do indicate that something unique exists within the Canadian SMDP 
structure. It provides the vehicle for rapid electoral change and amplifies the rise 
of surging parties and the death of declining parties. This is particularly 
interesting when one considers that Canada's counterparts in the United 
Kingdom have seen relative stability. For most of Canada's history, it possessed 
a relatively stable two-party system with a minor third party and very 
unspectacular elections (similar to that of Conservatives, Labour and Liberal 
Democrats in the United Kingdom).124 Yet, the Liberals, Conservatives, Bloc 
Quebecois, and New Democratic Party were affected in different ways, mainly by 
According to the Canadian Parliamentary process a government will be expected to call for an election 
after it has been in power for 4-5 years. However a government can be toppled prior to this and a new 
election would be set up by a majority vote known as a vote of non-confidence. 
Election Resources UK 
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an unsatisfied Quebec nation.125 The changes in partisanship at the provincial 
level in Quebec are yet another indication of this tumultuous situation. So, while 
the NDP is the latest champion of Quebec interests, history and the nature of 
similar-member districts indicate that it may be just as easily be swept out of 
office if it neglects its constituents. The BQ's 2011 loss of seats had a lot to do 
with the Single Member District Plurality system and therefore I am rejecting the 
null hypothesis. 
125
 The other influential party in this period, the Reform Party, was also indirectly related to the Quebec 
voting block as it was created to branch away from the Progressive Conservatives and appeal to Western 




The supposed death of the Bloc Quebecois and the separatist movement 
in Quebec leaves us with more questions than answers. However, the 2011 
election did confirm that Quebec remains influential in shaping electoral change 
in Canada. Quebec ended the Liberal Party's century-long dominance when it 
overwhelmingly voted for the Progressive Conservative Party in 1984. While the 
Liberals regained control of the government from 1993-2006, their support 
declined without their base in Quebec and hit an all-time low of seats in the 2011 
election. The Progressive Conservatives were also shown the door by 
Quebeckers in the 1993 election as they placed their trust in the Bloc Quebecois. 
In what became the biggest loss in Canadian history, the Progressive 
Conservative party dissolved and split until the unification of a new Conservative 
party in 2004. The Bloc became the latest victim, with the Quebec voters opting 
to support an untested but ideologically palatable party in 2011. 
72 
Does this mark the death of the separatist movement? It appears too soon 
to say. The recent fate of the Bloc Quebecois and the Parti Quebecois are 
troubling signs for the separatist movement. Can the New Democratic Party 
maintain support in Quebec? The prognosis has certainly become worse since 
the untimely death of Jack Layton, a charismatic leader who appeared to be the 
force to make Quebec believe in the NDP. 
When looking towards the future, the NDP needs to keep in mind that it 
was Quebec that elevated it from a perpetual third-party with marginal support to 
the vaunted status of Official Opposition. With the mandate comes responsibility. 
The man who probably understood this best was the late Jack Layton. The 
election of his replacement as NDP leader may provide the first test of the 
Quebec-NDP marriage. One of Layton's last requests was to have freshman 
Quebec MP Nycole Turmel to become the interim leader with Thomas Mulcair as 
one of her two deputy leaders. While Turmel is not expected to contend for the 
leadership role, Mulcair is very popular especially in Quebec. He is the only NDP 
MP in the province to be elected in a general election prior to 2011. However, his 
leadership chances are slim based upon large amount of Anglophone eligible 
voters in the NDP convention.126 The consequence of 2011 is that Quebec will 
be heavily underrepresented at this convention. An NDP leader will be chosen 
from a different area of Canada. This could constitute a huge slap in the face to 
Quebeckers. Polls have shown that support for the NDP would decrease and 
Hebert, C. (2011, Sept 21). "The NDP is failing Quebec's distinct political culture." Toronto Star. 
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return to the Bloc in Quebec should Mulcair not become the leader. The New 
Democratic Party preached 'positive change' for the past decade yet it runs the 
risk of turning its back on the same voters which provided the NDP with the 
mandate it enjoys. 
A strain in the NDP-Quebec relationship coupled with the typical pattern of 
parties making huge gains in the previous election could provide an opening for 
the Bloc Quebecois to make a return. While it appears that voters tired of the 
Bloc, it had certainly advocated for Quebec much better than the Liberals and 
Conservatives had in the past. The Bloc could reap the benefit of NDP's broken 
promises in the coming years. Due to there being a majority government for the 
first time since 2000, it appears that the Conservatives will not hold an election 
until 2015. This will give plenty of time for the NDP to either endear itself to 
Quebec or, alternately, fail and allow the Bloc Quebecois to use new energy to 
reel back in its constituents. 
The 2011 Canadian Federal Election in Quebec was not a referendum on 
separatism. It may represent a referendum on the Bloc Quebecois, at least in 
comparison to the New Democratic Party. We must think critically and 
understand that a difference exists between supporting the Bloc Quebecois and 
the Quebec separatism movement, although both groups have overlapping 
support. Nor should we assume a direct link between the Bloc and the provincial 
Parti Quebecois. While the two parties clearly have the same over-arching 
127
 Smith J. (2011, Sept 24). "NDP Would do best under Mulcair, Poll Finds." Toronto Star. 
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ideology, election figures and qualitative data show that the people of Quebec 
thought about the two parties differently, especially going into the 2011 election. 
Moderates and non-sovereigntists had a much easier time supporting the Bloc 
over the past couple of decades based upon its moderate policies and its focus 
of advancing the interests of Quebec. It filled a void that the Liberal and 
Conservative parties had left and provided a vehicle for Quebeckers to voice 
their frustration with the Harper government. 
The view and the leaders of the Parti Quebecois are viewed as much 
more dangerous. With the capability of holding the majority in the Quebec 
National Assembly, the Parti Quebecois has the ability to do much more damage. 
They appeal to separatists but not moderates. Duceppe shored up separatist 
support within his caucus but it came at the cost of alienating moderates. This 
nearly cost his party its political future. By reaching out to militant separatists like 
former Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau and current PQ leader Pauline Marois, 
Duceppe went from having a campaign perceived as lackluster and unenergetic, 
to one looking factionalized, bi-polar and dangerous. This identity confusion had 
dogged the Bloc over the period of 1993-2011. Yet, it was not until the party 
faced the adversity of the 2011 election that this problem nearly destroyed them. 
We must also realize that Jack Layton and the New Democratic Party's 
remarkable campaign gave Quebec an alternative outlet to the choices of the 
past. In a Brian Mulroney-like fashion, Layton gave Quebeckers a reason to 
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throw out the party that they heavily endorsed. The surge and consequent 
decline in Bloc Quebecois' was due to the realization of an identity crisis between 
its moderate policies and its separatist ideology. 
It is too early to determine what will happen to the Bloc Quebecois after its 
stunning defeat in 2011. Yet, it is also too early to declare it dead as a political 
party. The New Democratic Party is only the latest suitor of Quebec after voters 
there threw out the Social Credit Party in 1980, the Liberals in 1984, the 
Progressive Conservatives in 1993, and now the Bloc Quebecois in 2011. While 
the NDP very well could help repair relations between Quebec and the rest of 
Canada, the track record of Quebec certainly does not breed optimism. The NDP 
Leadership Race appears to be the first opportunity for the party to alienate 
Quebec after the province provided it 59 seats and propelled it to the Official 
Opposition. One NDP MP was possibly prophetic when he said Thomas Mulcair 
doesn't have support outside Quebec and that a majority cannot be achieved 
strictly in Quebec.128 Yet, he and the NDP must remember that Canadian 
electoral history has shown that turning ones back on Quebec is a fatal mistake, 
especially when trying to achieve a majority government on the national level. 
The Bloc Quebecois was so successful in Quebec because it did not need 
to be concerned with building a national consensus. By being limited to 
representing the province, it is much easier to pander to the needs of the Quebec 
Nation. Parliamentary party discipline was very natural for the BQ while proving 
128
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more difficult for Federalist parties, in large part because of Quebec. The 
Progressive Conservatives met their defeat as they failed to unite Quebec and 
the rest of Canada with both Meech Lake and Charlottetown. The New 
Democratic Party is already experiencing difficulties as it attempts to make 
Quebec and the rest of Canada happy. Its staunch opposition to the Harper 
government's bill to abolish the Long Gun Registry129 is certainly a move that 
Quebec celebrates, as the provincial government wants to create its own 
registry. Yet, two NDP MPs in particular, Charlie Angus (Timmins—James Bay) 
and Dennis Bevington (Western Arctic) longtime advocates of scrapping the 
registry had to contradict personal campaign promises to avoid party discipline. 
In closing, the 2011 election exemplifies how Canada is a strong 
exception to Duverger's Law. The unique cultural and lingual situation that 
developed between Quebec and the rest of Canada over the past 3 centuries, 
creates a situation where regionalism matters more than partisanship. The 
particular historical context does not allow for a great amount of generalization to 
other situations. This is why Duverger's law remains such a strong influence in 
the theory of political science. Emerging democracies with strong ethnic 
diversities could form blocks and follow the path of the Bloc Quebecois. 
However, for now, the validity of this thesis lies within the profound impact that 
the Quebec vote has on the Canadian House of Commons. Any paradigm shift or 
success of a minor party is because of their endorsement by the Quebec Nation. 
In other words, a mundane two-party system would still exist if Quebec were a 
129
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separate county. Instead, the province provides both electoral success and 
failure to Canada's political parties. 
Ultimately, the electorate remains unchanged on the issue of separation. 
The perception of alienation is also unchanged. Quebec remains a distinct 
society. The 2011 Canadian Federal Election changed the political landscape. It 
potentially ended the Bloc Quebecois as a strong federal party. Yet most 
importantly, it exemplifies the historically consistent rejection of previously 
popular political parties that lose the confidence of the Quebec Nation. 
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APPENDIX A 
NDP ORANGE CRUSH 
Note: Percentages in bold represent a situation where there is an increase in the 
popular vote for a Liberal or Conservative candidate from 2008 to 2011. The Bloc 
Quebecois lost support in every single Quebec riding while the New Democratic 
Party gained support in every single Quebec riding. All electoral data used is 


















































































































































Jeanne-Le Ber 34.9% 
Joliette 52.4% 
Jonquiere—Alma 37.6% 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CONTACT HYPOTHESIS 2004-2011 
Note: This chart is used to evaluate the contact hypothesis over the past four 
elections by analyzing the percentage of the vote received by the Bloc 
Quebecois compared to the amount of Francophones in particular ridings. 
Percentages in Bold mean that the Bloc Quebecois won that particular riding in 
that year. The percentage of Francophones is based upon the 2006 Canadian 
Census' statistic of French as a home language in each particular riding. All 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PROTEST PARTIES 2004-2011 
Note: Protest Party in this chart is defined as supporting the Green Party, the 
Bloc Quebecois and the New Democratic Party. All three parties' percentages of 
support are compiled for each of the four elections utilized. All electoral data 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUPPORT FLUCTUATIONS IN CANADIAN RIDINGS 
Note: Quebec is excluded in this chart because the Quebec data with actual 
percentages in presented in Appendix A. Up signifies that the percentage of the 
popular vote increased for that particular party in that particular riding. Down 
signifies that the percentage of the popular vote decreased for that particular 



















































































Conservative MP Michelle Rempel received the exact percentage (56.53%) as her predecessor Jim 
Prentice did in the 2008 election 
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Pitt Meadows—Maple Ridge-Mission 
Port Moody—Westwood—Port Coquitlam 














































































































































Riding NDP CP LP 
Victoria 
West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea 
























New Brunswick Southwest 
Saint John 
Tobique—Mactaquac 
Newfoundland & Labrador 
Avalon 
Bonavista—Gander-Grand Falls-Windsor 
Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte 
Labrador 
Random—Burin—St. George's 
St. John's East 



















































































































The Liberal Party decided not a run a candidate in the riding of Central Nova because they felt it gave 
Green Party Leader Elizabeth May a better chance at defeating incumbent minister Peter Mackay 
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Don Valley East 
























































































































































Lanark-Frontenac—Lennox & Addington 
Leeds-Grenville 
London—Fanshawe 


























































































































































































der Bay—Rainy River 
























































































































































































OPEN LETTER OF FORMER BQ MEMBERS 
NOTE: The following is the letter written by Maxime Bellerose and Benoit Dumay 
on April 28th 2011, in which they call on separatists to vote for the NDP. This is 
my translation from the original French copy. 
Call to Sovereigntists to Vote for the NDP 
This letter is co-signed by Maxime Bellerose former president of the Bloc 
Quebecois riding association of the district ofHochelaga during the last term of 
former Bloc MP Real Menard and Benoit Demuy, political aide of the same 
member until his resignation in 2009. Both are currently members of the Bloc 
Quebecois. 
Three weeks ago people around us wouldn't have predicted that we would 
prepare to make the argument that we are making today. Like all interested 
people to progress and social justice we support the NDP promises and its 
program. As sovereigntists we have always been convinced that the only option 
for Quebec was to vote for the Bloc Quebecois during the federal elections. Our 
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analytical framework was binary: « l f you are a sovereigntist you vote for the 
Bloc, if not you are a federalist» 
The reality is that the campaign has forced us to revise our thinking. The 
orange wind blowing over the Quebec nation and the rest of Canada leaves open 
the possibility, the unique opportunity of an official opposition or even an NDP 
government. 
Now for the first time in our political experience, social democracy is at the 
door of Parliament! It would be a shame for Quebeckers not to take this 
opportunity to send MPs to Ottawa with the values and justice that Quebec 
supports. 
Now we are and will remain deeply convinced that sovereignty remains 
the best way for Quebec and its people can continue its development but as 
many say, the sovereignty of Quebec will be in Quebec and not in Ottawa. In the 
meantime, all our citizens will, willingly or not, live in federal Canada. 
Until our referendum win, voting for the NDP is the way out of the cycle of 
the minority Conservative government. It's the best option currently and actually 
available to improve the lives of Quebeckers and the most vulnerable among us. 
Giving support to the NDP is a vote for a mixture of energetic and experienced 
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candidates. This includes young candidates who are needed for renewal in the 
political sphere. 
We cannot afford to tolerate conservative governments of such a right 
ideological nature in Ottawa. Despite our aspirations it speaks for us on the 
international stage and takes advantage of their re-election mandate after 
mandate, pushing unacceptable laws and will have impacts on the Quebec 
nation. 
We have an intimate knowledge of the organization of the Bloc 
Quebecois. We were among the cogs of the organization, but we have seen that 
the Bloc Quebecois has gradually distanced itself from the ideals that led to its 
foundation. Candidates removed from people, distant members, away from local 
concerns and these people were literally placed in their seats by this 
organization. These candidates have been incompetent to carry the message 
that should inspire the part of Gilles Duceppe and mutated the party organization 
that shows his face in his campaign, which allowed us to make our reasoning 
this: Given the opportunity to choose between two parties, why not vote for the 
one who has the ideals like us and who has the best chance to win our principles 
on the federal level. 
On May 2nd we will put our mark next to the New Democratic candidate, 
proud to participate in building a better future for the people of this country, 
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happy to enjoy the unique momentum given to us and realize that exercised our 
vote without contradiction with our national aspirations for Quebec. 
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